POPULAR CHOICE, FEDERAL LOSS: ASSESSING THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT’S DEMOCRATIC TRADEOFFS

Author: Caleb Neal, Senior Editor

Introduction

The U.S. Constitution is a perpetual touchstone for every argument over rights, power, and government, yet many Americans, including some of the most educated among us, would struggle to explain what certain parts of it actually do. One of the most overlooked examples is the Seventeenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1913, which transformed how U.S. senators are chosen by shifting their election from state legislatures to direct vote by the people.[i] At the time, this change was seen as a necessary reform to fight corruption and legislative gridlock, but its long-term effects continue to stir debate today.[ii] It greatly shifted voting patterns in the Senate, increased the cost of elections, and redefined what it means for American democracy to be truly “by the people.”[iii]‍ ‍

Why Was the Amendment Viewed as Necessary? ‍ ‍

The Seventeenth Amendment emerged from two serious problems with the existing system: widespread corruption in the election process and chronic deadlock in state legislatures.[iv] During the late 1800s, senatorial elections were widely believed to be bought and sold, though the full extent of this corruption remains debated.[v] Beyond direct bribery, reformers argued that election by state legislators enabled "machine politics" and gave corporations undue influence over the Senate.[vi] They believed that direct election would break the two-party machine and reduce corporate interference in politics.[vii] These concerns were given urgency by the years between 1891 and 1905, when eight state legislatures failed to elect senators at all, leaving seats vacant and governments paralyzed.[viii] While the Seventeenth Amendment earned broad support and was ratified quickly, its effects on the country were profound. It dramatically increased the cost of elections and fundamentally shifted the balance of power between the states and the federal government.[ix]‍ ‍

The Cost of Elections

One readily apparent effect of the amendment has been the cost of senatorial elections.[x] Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, the cost of running for a Senate seat was significantly lower as a candidate needed only to persuade the state legislature rather than mount a statewide campaign. A comparison found that in the years between 1871 and 1913, the total cost of Senate elections averaged around $214.88 million per year in inflation-adjusted dollars.[xi] By contrast, the average cost of a single Senate seat in 2018 was $15.7 million.[xii]  And the total cost of the 2012 Senate election cycle was $1.168 billion.[xiii] This dramatic increase stems at least in part from senators now being required to campaign before an entire state's electorate rather than a small legislative body.[xiv]‍

The Shift in Voting Tendencies and Power Caused by the Seventeenth Amendment

Alexander Hamilton was a strong proponent of tying the Senate to state governments rather than the general electorate. With state governments electing the Senate, Hamilton argued, the Senate would "owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State Governments." [xv] James Madison similarly believed that giving state governments a role in the formation of the federal government secured them lasting  authority within it.[xvi] Beyond accountability, the indirect election of senators was intended to insulate the chamber from the impulses and passions of the populace, a role the House of Representatives was designed to fill instead, with its shorter terms and direct elections. Scholars sympathetic to Madison and Hamilton’s interpretation believe the Seventeenth Amendment destroyed a necessary check on federal power, creating a Senate that feels free to legislate on matters “abstract, general, novel, discretionary, and prescriptive,” in contrast to pre-amendment legislation that was more concrete, specific, traditional, rule-bound, and proscriptive.[xvii]  Studies have shown that the Seventeenth Amendment caused senators to shift their policy priorities to align more closely with the House (a directly elected body), shifting their priorities to topics “like taxation, economic policy, and democratic representation while reducing attention to areas such as infrastructure and immigration.”[xviii]                    Some writers go further, suggesting that the Seventeenth Amendment shifted power not only from the states to Congress, but from the states to the Supreme Court.[xix] Rossum contends that with federalism’s structural protection stripped away,  states have become reliant on the protection of the Supreme Court to uphold the framers’ original federalist design.[xx] These views are not universal. Some scholars argue that the amendment's effects have been tempered by state practices that defy its spirit, while others contend that little actually changed, pointing to evidence that the pre-amendment Senate already ignored state interests due to national party politics.[xxi]

Conclusion          

The Seventeenth Amendment changed far more than how senators are elected; it changed the balance of American government itself. What started as an effort to make the system more democratic ended up reshaping the connection between states, citizens, and Washington. While some see it as a necessary reform that gave people a stronger voice, others view it as the moment when states lost their seat at the national table. Regardless of where one stands on its broader effects, the Amendment’s impact on cost of elections is a product that cannot be argued. Over a century later, most Americans hardly know this amendment exists, but whether one sees it as progress or a mistake, there is no question that the Seventeenth Amendment permanently altered the way the country’s politics play out.

[i] U.S. Const. amend. XVII.

[ii] Zachary D. Clopton & Steven E. Art, The Meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment and a Century of State Defiance, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1181, 1189 (2015).

[iii] Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 671, 704-708 (1999).

[iv] Amar, supra note iv, at 1353; Rossum, supra note iii, at 707.

[v] Rossum, supra note iii, at 707.

[vi] Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500, 539-540 (1997); See Edward C. Banfield & James Q. Wilson, City Politics 119–25 (Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (“Machine politics” has been described as “a hierarchical party organization that distributes patronage in exchange for political support and uses disciplined control over nominations and offices to maintain power.”)

[vii] Bybee, supra note vi, at 540.

[viii] Id. at 542.

[ix] Wallace Worthy Hall, The History and Effect of the Seventeenth Amendment 440 (1936) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Berkeley)) (on file with University of California (Berkeley) Dept. of Political Science).

[x] Hall, supra note ix.

[xi] Wendy J. Schiller & Charles Stwart III, The 100th Anniversary of the 17th Amendment: A Promise Unfulfilled?, Issues in Governance, 59 (May 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Schiller_17th-Amendment_v7.pdf.

[xii] Srijita Datta, Senate races attract nearly $1 billion ahead of 2022 midterms, Open Secrets, https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2022/08/senate-races-attract-nearly-1-billion-ahead-of-2022-midterms/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2025).

[xiii] Schiller & Stewart, supra note xiv.

[xiv] Hall, supra note xiii, at 440.

[xv] Rossum, supra note iii, at 678.

[xvi] Id.‍ ‍

[xvii] Rossum, supra note xviii, at 708, citing Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority, 134-135 (1969).

[xviii] Adriano Amati & Sergio Galleta, “One Person, One Vote”: The Effect of Direct Elections on U.S. Senators, Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series (March 2025), https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/server/api/core/bitstreams/51f95096-62c5-4d42-a133-47ab05efa622/content (last visited Nov. 23, 2025).

[xix] Rossum, supra note iii, at 704-709.

[xx] Id.

[xxi] David Schleicher, The Seventeenth Amendment and Federalism in an Age of National Political Parties, 65 Hastings L.J. 1043 (2014).