Mathena v. Malvo: Considering Youth in Mandatory and Discretionary Sentencing

By Tyler Arnzen, Senior Editor

During the last two decades, the Eighth Amendment has been expanded to afford more sentencing protection to juveniles convicted of crimes.[1] For example, in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that a juvenile could not be sentenced to death because it was a cruel and unusual punishment when imposed upon such a young individual.[2] Similarly, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court decided that juvenile offenders could not be sentenced to a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole.[3] In Miller, the Supreme Court reasoned that youth was only a temporary phase and that an individual should only be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if their crime indicates “irreparable corruption.”[4] Then, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the Miller rule should retroactively apply to vacate the sentences of juveniles sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole prior to the Miller decision.[5] The plain language of Miller and Montgomery makes it apparent that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional.[6] However, it remains unclear whether the ruling is also applicable to a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court’s pending decision in Mathena v. Malvo might settle this issue. [7]

The Facts of Mathena v. Malvo.

As a juvenile, Lee Malvo was convicted of multiple counts of capital murder and received multiple life sentences without the possibility of parole.[8] Malvo was sentenced under a discretionary sentencing scheme prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper, Miller, and Montgomery.[9] Because he was sentenced prior to these cases being decided, Malvo claims that his status as a juvenile was not considered at sentencing as is required prior to any sentencing of life imprisonment without parole.[10] Malvo filed a habeas petition with the Eastern District of Virginia to have his sentence overturned on the grounds that it was unconstitutional.[11] The District Court agreed with Malvo, vacated his sentences, and ordered him to be resentenced.[12] The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling.[13] The State of Virginia filed a petition of certiorari with the Supreme Court that was granted on March 18, 2019.[14]

The Petitioner’s Argument

The State of Virginia asserts that the lower courts erred by expanding the rulings in Miller and Montgomery to also include discretionary sentences.[15] This assertion is based upon a narrow interpretation of the Miller holding – juveniles cannot be sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment.[16] The Miller decision was silent regarding discretionary sentencing.[17] Montgomery only made this holding retroactive to juveniles who were sentenced prior to Miller and did not introduce any additional Constitutional requirements.[18] The State of Virginia contends that because neither decision impacted discretionary sentences, the Court of Appeals erred and Malvo’s sentencing should not have been overturned.[19]

The Respondent’s Argument

In contrast, Malvo argues that the reasoning behind Miller and Montgomery is applicable to all cases where juveniles are sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.[20] This view is based on the Court’s rationale that juveniles are inherently different from adults and that sentencing should be individualized.[21] This rationale and the language from Miller and Montgomery mean that a juvenile’s youth must be considered during sentencing.[22] Malvo contends that because the lower court did not consider his youth during sentencing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.[23]

What the Supreme Court Should Rule

While the Court is likely to accept Malvo’s purely legal argument, the Court will likely overturn the ruling of the lower court based on the specific facts of the case. Malvo’s legal argument that a juvenile’s youth must be considered during all sentencing is likely to be successful because of the extreme emphasis placed on the importance of youth in the Supreme Court’s prior rulings. “‘An offender's age,’ … ‘is relevant to the Eighth Amendment,’ and so ‘criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.’”[24] During oral arguments, Justice Kagan succinctly summarized the plain understanding of this quote and the entirety of Miller, put aptly “youth matters.”[25] Given the emphasis placed on youth, the Court is likely to clarify that youth must be considered in all instances when a juvenile is sentenced.

However, the Virginia Supreme Court has already determined that judges have long had the ability to suspend life sentences.[26] This is even codified in the Virginia Code which states that “[a]fter conviction … the court may suspend imposition of sentence or suspend the sentence in whole or part….”[27] Furthermore, Virginia law gives defendants the “opportunity to present mitigation evidence at [the] sentencing hearing.”[28] Evidence that can be introduced to mitigate sentencing can include evidence on “the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct” and “the age of the defendant at the time of the commission of the capital offense.”[29]

Malvo had an opportunity to present evidence relating to his youth, and the sentencing court could reduce his sentence if it found such evidence persuasive.  However, Malvo did not present any such evidence at trial or even ask to receive a reduced sentence.[30] Since he had the opportunity to introduce evidence of his youth, Malvo cannot now claim that the sentence is in violation of the Eighth Amendment. While this ruling will not benefit Malvo, it will benefit individuals who have not yet been resentenced under Miller because they were sentenced under a discretionary sentencing scheme.

Footnotes

[1] For the purposes of this article, “juvenile” means an individual who has not yet attained the age of eighteen years old.

[2] Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361

 (1989)).

[3] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (made retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016)).

[4] Id. at 479-80 (2012).

[5] Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718, 732-36 (finding Miller to be a “substantive rule of constitutional law” that must be applied retroactively).

[6] Miller, 567 U.S. at 465; Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 732-36.

[7] Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217 (U.S. filed Mar. 18, 2019).

[8] Brief for Respondent at 8-10, Mathena v. Malvo, (No. 18-217) (U.S. argued Oct. 16, 2019).

[9] Id. at 10-13.

[10] Id. at 30.

[11] Malvo v. Mathena, 254 F. Supp. 3d 820, 824 (E.D. Va. 2017).

[12] Id. at 835.

[13] Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018).

[14] Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S.Ct. 1317 (U.S. filed Mar. 18, 2019) (No. 18-217).

[15] Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Mathena v. Malvo, (No. 18-217) (U.S. argued Oct. 16, 2019).

[16] Id. at 19-21.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 22-23.

[19] Id. at 24-36.

[20] Brief for Respondent at 22, Mathena v. Malvo, (No. 18-217) (U.S. argued Oct. 16, 2019).

[21] Id. at 23-27.

[22] Id. at 27-30.

[23] Id. at 54.

[24] Miller, 567 U.S. at 473-74 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010)).

[25] Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Mathena v. Malvo (No. 18-217) (U.S. argued Oct. 16, 2019).

[26] Jones v. Virginia, 795 S.E.2d 705, 711, 713 (2017).

[27] Va. Code Ann. §19.2-303 (West 1993) (This version of the Virginia Code was used when Malvo was originally sentenced).

[28] Jones, 795 S.E.2d at 713.

[29] Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.4 B. (West 2003) (This version of the Virginia Code was used when Malvo was originally sentenced)(emphasis added).

[30] Brief for Respondent at 9-10, Mathena v. Malvo, (No. 18-217) (U.S. argued Oct. 16, 2019).